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clusion when it reinstated an alimony obligation upon the death of
the second husband because the remarriage was invalid. This decision
"to avoid a particular result in a particular case may produce a host
of injustices in the cases to follow."3 1
B. WAYNE TUCKER
RIGHT TO ENTER AS DEFENSE TO CHARGE
OF BURGLARY
Implicit in the definition of burglary is the idea that the entry
must be an unlawful one. One recurring problem in this regard is
whether consent to enter prevents the entry from being unlawful,
even though it is accompanied by a criminal intent. There is particu-
larly fertile ground for conflict when, as a defense to a burglary
charge, such consent is claimed by virtue of the premises being open
at the time to the public business.
This conflict is brought into focus by two recent cases, State v.
Keys' from Oregon, and Macias v. People2 from Colorado. In each
case the defendant entered a pay telephone booth with intent to com-
mit larceny of the money in the coin box. Both indictments were
framed under substantially similar burglary statutes, which eliminate
the requirement of a breaking.
3
The defendant in Keys contended that an entry of a building to
which the public is invited for business is not an unlawful entry, not-
withstanding a contemporaneous larcenous intent, because it is an entry
which has been consented to. In a four-to-three decision the Oregon
Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention and affirmed the bur-
glary conviction. It was held that, regardless of its character, any
' 2 64 N.Y.S.2d at i2o.
1419 P.2d 943 (Ore. 1966).
"421 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1966).
"Every unlawful entry of any building, booth ... or other structure... men-
tioned in ORS 164.240, with intent to steal or commit any felony therein, is
a breaking and entering of the same within the meaning of ORS 164.24o [which
defines burglary in terms of 'breaks and enters']." ORE. REv. STAT. § 164.220 (1965).
"Every person who shall willfully and forcibly break and enter or willfully,
without force, enter any building... with intent to commit... larceny, or other
felony or misdemeanor.., shall be deemed guilty of burglary...." CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40-3-5 (1963).
Nothing turned on any possible difference between the terms "unlawful
entry" and "willfully .... enter" in the two statutes.
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entry is unlawful if accompanied by an intent to commit larceny or a
felony within the structure. The court noted that, although it is well
established that an unlimited consent is a defense to a charge of
burglary, it is equally well established that a consent limited as to
place, time, or purpose is not a defense where entry occurs outside the
stated or implied limitation. The court concluded that the invitation
to enter the telephone booth was limited to an invitation for a law-
ful purpose only and that defendant's entry, having been made for an
unlawful purpose, was outside the limitation.
The dissenting justices interpreted "unlawful," as used in the
statute, as being limited "to wrongful means employed in gaining
entry." 4 They said that under the majority's interpretation: one who
enters a courthouse under subpoena, intending to commit perjury, or
one who enters a bank, intending to forge a check, would be a burglar.
They thought other statutes dealt adequately with such perjurers and
checkforgers.
The appeal in Macias was based on the question whether a tele-
phone booth is a "building" within the Colorado burglary statute.
Even though the issue of consent was not raised as a defense at the
trial or on appeal, the court deemed the point of "such paramount
importance" that it met the problem on its own motion. In reversing
the conviction the five-to-two majority noted that burglary has always
included an element of trespass, either actual or constructive. The ma-
jority concluded that since the defendant, as a member of the public,
was invited to enter the telephone booth, there was no trespass, that
is, no unlawful entry into the booth.
The dissent said that because defendant did not enter the premises
for a purpose connected with the owner's business, he was neither an
an invitee nor a licensee, but a trespasser. By way of illustrating the
fallacy of the majority's doctrine, the dissent suggested that if a negli-
gently placed telephone had fallen on the defendant and injured
him, he could not have asserted that he was a business visitor to whom
the telephone company owed a duty of care not to injure.
As the principal cases make apparent, the conflict over the effect
of consent to enter turns upon whether or not a right to enter is
lost when it is accompanied by criminal intent.
Under the "right to enter" principle, it is... held that when
a store is open to the general public, the defendant is not guilty
of burglary if he enters with the intent to steal. In some states
this "right to enter" principle has been avoided by holding that
'419 P.2d at 948.
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when a person having the right to enter for a lawful purpose
does so with the intention of stealing, it is burglary, since such
person has no right to enter for the purpose of stealing.5
People v. Barry6 is the leading case in a long line of California
decisions7 which have qualified or avoided the "right to enter" prin-
ciple. The California statute defines burglary simply as an entry with
a requisite criminal intent.8 Barry noted that the requirements of
statutory burglary had been met by any entry made with larcenous
intent into an open grocery store. To defendant's contention that his
entry was lawful because he entered under invitation to the public, the
court answered that one "who enters with the intention to commit
a felony enters without an invitation."9
Barry is the leading authority for this rule, even in jurisdictions
where an Oregon or Colorado-type statute is in force. In Arkansas, for
example, where the statute used the term "unlawful entering," Barry
was quoted with approval and defendant was found guilty of burglary
where he had stolen liquor from a saloon which was open for
business at the time.'0
Right to enter is also raised as a defense to burglary in situations
analogous to an invitation to the public. For example, under the
"right to enter" principle an employee is not guilty of burglary if he
enters with intent to steal, during his hours of employment, a place
2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 414, at 38-39 (1957).
694 Cal. 481, 29 Pac. 1026 (1892).
People v. Brittain, 142 Cal. 8, 75 Pac. 314 0904); People v. Garcia, 214 Cal.
App. 2d 681, 29 Cal. Rptr. 609 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Hildreth, 202 Cal.
App. 2d 468, 21 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Wilson, i6o Cal. App. 2d
6o6, 325 P.2d io6 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); People v. Corral, 6o Cal. App. 2d 66, 140
P.2d 172 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943). These cases all deal with business premises open to
the public. The Barry rule of avoiding the "right to enter" principle has also been
applied in other situations where defendant had consent to enter: E.g., People
v. Talbot, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966) (consent of owner to enter so that
house guest of owner could be robbed); People v. Sears, 62 Cal. 2d 737, 401 P.2d
938, 44 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1965) (entry of defendant's own home); People v. Garrow,
130 Cal. App. 2d 75, 278 P.2d 475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (entry of dwelling house
pursuant to express personal invitation).
""Every person who enters any house... or other building... with intent to
commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 459. The basic requirements of this statue have not been changed since 1876.
029 Pac., at 1027; accord, State v. Bull, 47 Idaho 336, 276 Pac. 528 (1929) (nearly
identical statute).
1 Pinson v. State, 91 Ark. 434, 121 S.W. 751 (19o9); accord, People v. Schneller,
69 Ill. App. 2d 50, 216 N.E.2d 510 (1966) (entry of public museum under statute
making one guilty of burglary "when without authority he knowingly enters');
Commonwealth v. Schultz, 168 Pa. Super. 435, 79 A.2d lO9 (1951) (theft of vending
machine from men's room of bar under statute defining burglary as "wilfully and
maliciously" entering); see Walders v. State, ioi Ark. 345, 142 S.W. 511 (1912).
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he is generally authorized to enter. In one case"1 it was found that
because defendant employee had a key to all company depot doors
and there was no regulation governing its use, he had a right to enter
the company freight house at the time he committed petit larceny.
"Hence this offense, if burglary, is raised to that grade solely by his
unlawful intent. But intent alone is not always sufficient for that
purpose. There is 'no burglary, if the person entering has a right so
to do, although he may intend to commit, and may actually commit,
a felony... .,12 Some authority avoids the "right to enter" principle
under these circumstances by holding that entering with a criminal
intent is not within the trust or employment and so not within any
right.13 Under either view an employee who enters with criminal intent
after working hours the premises where he works is guilty of burglary
because he has no right to enter at such time.' 4 Likewise, an employee
entering during his working hours a place which he has been given
authority to enter is guilty of burglary because he has no right to
enter such place.15
The "right to enter" principle is treated the same in jurisdictions
which require a breaking as an element of burglary as it is in jurisdic-
tions where no breaking is required. Thus, an early case' G held there
Stowell v. People, 104 Colo. 255, 90 P.2d 520 (1939).
I-Id. at 521; accord, People v. Carstensen, 420 P.2d 820 (Colo. 1966).
1E.g., State v. Howard, 64 S.C. 344, 42 S.E. 173, 175 (1902). "A servant's right
to enter his master's dwelling depends upon the purpose with which he enters."
"'Pointer v. State, 148 Ala. 676, 41 So. 929 (19o6); Lowder v. State, 63 Ala. 143
(1879); State v. Corcoran, 82 Wash. 44, 143 Pac. 453 (1914).
15Van Walker v. State, 33 Tex. Crim, 359, 26 S.W. 507 (1894); Morrow v. State,
25 SAW. 284 (Tex. Grim. App. 1894).
"6State v. Newbegin, 25 Me. 500 (1846). State v. Stephens, 15o La. 944, 91 So.
349 (1922), is often cited as standing for the proposition that when one enters a
store open to the public with intent to commit a felony it is not a burglary because
there is consent. E.g., People v. Sine, 277 App. Div. 908, 98 N.Y.S.2d 588 (195o)
(cited by dissent); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 153 n.34 (1957); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
L W AND PROCEDURE § 414 n.12 (1957); 12 G.J.S. Burglary § 12 n.50 (1938). However,
Stephens simply held that because a Louisiana statute defining burglary as "break
or enter" really meant "break and enter," defendant could not be guilty of burglary
under an indictment charging that he did "willfully ... and with intent to commit
a crime ... enter the store...."
State v. Moore, 12 N.H. 42 (1841), is another case which dealt with this
problem but is dubious authority for the proposition because the opinion is con-
fused. It is difficult to tell whether the decision was based on the first or second,
or both, of the following grounds: (I) insufficiency of proof that defendant's larcen-
ous intent existed at the time of his entry; (2) defendant's lawful presence on the
premises precluded a burglarious breaking and entry of a public room on those
premises. The majority in Barry laid the basis of the Moore decision upon the
first ground, while the dissent in that case cited Moore for the second ground.
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was no breaking, and therefore no burglary, because at the time of
entry the store was open for business:
The opening of a shop door in the day time, which had been
closed only to exclude the dust or cold air, with a design that
it should be opened by all, who should be inclined to enter,
could not be a violation of any security designed to exclude,
and therefore not a breaking. It would not even be a trespass,
for the custom of trade in it would be evidence of a general
license to enter.
17
But in New York' s and Texas 19 burglary convictions based on break-
ing and entering of premises open to the public have been affirmed on
the ground that there is no license to enter to commit a crime.
In an analogous situation, where one has a personal invitation or
license to enter premises at any time, a burglary conviction is precluded
because of the right to enter in jurisdictions requiring a breaking.20
The same rule applies where the premises are defendant's own.21 On
the other hand, where burglary is defined in terms of an entry with
the requisite intent, it is possible for one to burglarize premises which
he has been given an unlimited personal consent to enter.22 But some
jurisdictions with such statutes also require a trespassory entry,23 which
is precluded when there is consent.24
"State v. Newbegin, supra note 16, at 504.
'People v. Sine, 277 App. Div. go, 98 N.Y.S.2d 588 (195o) (department store
open for business.)
21Trevino v. State, 158 Tex. Grim. 252, 254 S.W.2d 788 (1952) (church open to
the public); Trevino v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 255, 254 S.W.2d 786 (1952); Thurston
v. State, 132 Tex. Grim. 287, 130 S.W.2d 770 (1937) (boarding house); Gonzales v.
State, 5o S.W. ,oi8 (Tex. Grim. App. 1899) (storehouse open for business).
'People v. Kelley, 253 App. Div. 430, 3 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1938) (card carrying mem-
bers entered athletic club open to its members twenty-four hours a day); Jones v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. 481, 236 S.W.2d 8o5 (1951) (nephew had consent to enter at
will); Britton v. State, 14o Tex. Grim. 408, 145 S.W.2d 878 (1940) (neighbor had
consent to enter at will); Shaffer v. State, 137 Tex. Grim. 476, 132 S.W.2d 263
(1939); Miller v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 345, 125 S.W.2d 596 (1939) (defendant fre-
quently visited filling station); Davis v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 521, 11o S.E. 356
(1922) (defendant had key to premises and came and went as member of family).
Contra, State v. Skillings, 98 N.H. 203, 97 A.2d 202 (1953) (defendant had license to
enter freely on errands for victim's benefit).
2Clarke v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 908 (1874); State v. Howard, 64
S.C. 344, 42 S.E. 173, 175 (1902) (dictum).
nState v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 354, 385 P.2d 227 (1963) (permission to enter filling
station); McCreary v. State, 25 Ariz. 1, 212 Pac. 336 (1923) (permission to pass through
complaining witness' adjoining room any time); People v. Garrow, 13o Cal. App.
2d 75, 278 P.2d 475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (express invitation to enter dwelling
house); see State v. Hall, 168 Iowa 221, 15o N.W. 97 (1914) (invitation from owner's
wife to commit adultery with her).
'I.e., an entry in which wrongful means are employed, as opposed to an other-
wise lawful entry accompanied by criminal intent.
-'State v. Starkweather, 89 Mont. 381, 297 Pac. 497 (1931) (defendant entered
1967]
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Generally, a jurisdiction will be consistent in its treatment of the
issue of consent to enter and will allow or disallow it as a defense
whether it arises from an invitation to the public or from an analogous
situation.2 5 However, New York and Texas are curious in that consent
to enter is apparently a defense depending upon whether the right
or privilege is extended to the defendant personally or to him as a
member of the public at large. Where defendants, as members of a
New York City athletic club open twenty-four hours a day, had a
personal right to enter the club premises it was held: "It is funda-
mental that there can be no breaking or entering a building if the
person entering has the right to do so.''26 This "fundamental" principle
apparently had no application where the right to enter a department
store was by invitation to the public to transact business. 27 Likewise,
in the Texas cases28 consent was held to preclude burglary when
defendant had a personal invitation to enter private or public premises
at any time. However, when defendant's only claimed invitation was
that the premises were open to the public at the time, burglary could
be established, notwithstanding the express or implied consent to
enter for lawful purposes.
29
voluntary consent, express or implied, will affect a burglary charge
New York and Texas are exceptions, however. In most states a
voluntary consent, express or implied, will affect a burglary charge
uniformly, regardless of whether it is personal or public in nature.30
premises he was leasing to steal landlord's goods); State v. Mish, 36 Mont. 168, 92
Pac. 459 (19o7) (defendant entered his own room); see State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389,
279 Pac. 950 (1929) (defendant entitled to instruction that he honestly believed he
had permission to enter the premises).
E.g., California consistently follows the Barry rule and holds that consent
to enter is never a defense. See cases cited note 8, supra.
26People v. Kelley, 253 App. Div. 430, 3 N.Y.S.2d 46, 49 (1938).
-People v. Sine, 277 App. Div. 9o8, 98 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1950). However, it should
be noted that Sine and Kelley, supra note 26, were decided by separate departments
of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. The decisions of one
department are not necessarily binding on the other departments. Only the Court
of Appeals decisions are binding on all the departments of the Supreme Court.
2Jones v. State, 155 Tex. Grim. 481, 236 S.V.2d 805 (1951); Britton v. State, 140
Tex. Grim. 4o8, 145 S.W.2d 878 (1940); Shaffer v. State, 137 Tex. Grim. 476, 132
S.W.2d 263 (1939); Miller v. State, 136 Tex. Grim. 345, 125 S.W.2d 596 (1939).
:'Thurston v. State, 132 Tex. Grim. 287, 1o3 S.W.2d 770 (1937); Gonzales v.
State, 50 S.W. ioi8 (Tex. Grim. App. 1899); Trevino v. State, 158 Tex. Grim. 252,
254 S.W.2d 788 (1952).
Unlike New York there is no ground for distinguishing the opposite results
of the analogous cases on the basis of the court which decided them. There is only
one Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas.
30E.g., People v. Barry, 94 Cal. 481, 29 Pac. 1026 (1892), and People v. Garrow,
13o Cal. App. 2d 75, 278 P.2d 475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Macias v. People, 421 P.2d
us6 (Colo. 1966), and Stowell v. People, 104 Colo. 255, 90 P.2d 520 (1939). Macias,
one of the principal cases, cited Stowell (employee entering company depot during
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Therefore, the precise issue of consent in regard to places open to
the public will be settled by answering the broader question whether
a contemporaneous criminal intent itself makes an entry an unlawful
one.31 The case law on this question reveals an irreconcilable conflict
based on adherence to or avoidance of the "right to enter" principle.
Whether burglary is defined in terms of a breaking and enter-
ing, an unlawful or wilful (or like term) entry, or any entry accom-
panied by requisite criminal intent, a trespassory entry as a pre-
requisite for a burglary conviction seems justifiable. One undesirable
result of not reguiring a trespassory entry is that it may be possible to
commit burglary of one's own house.32 Not only would such a result
be manifestly harsh, but it is contrary to the common law rule that
"one cannot commit burglary of his own dwelling house, since burglary
is the breaking and entering... of the dwelling house of an-
other. .... ,,. 3
Furthermore, there is less danger of the occurrence of incidental
crimes against the person when the thief or felon has entered under
a right, than when he is a trespasser.3 4 The American Law Institute
his hours of employment) as being "almost directly in point." The court said that
the "precise question" decided in Stowell was that in spite of a felonious intent,
there is no burglary if there is a right to enter.
Even in jurisdictions which treat the issue of consent uniformly in burglary
cases, there may be one situation where it is treated differently from the other
cases where consent is pleaded as a defense. This exception arises when defendant
is allowed to enter so that he can be entrapped. The basis for the distinction lies
in a general rule of entrapment, which is applicable to all crimes, rather than in
a rule of burglary. Where there is an active procurement or inducement by the
victim of a crime there can be no conviction; but where there has been only passive
consent to the perpetration of the crime a conviction is not precluded. As applied
to burglary the rule is: " 'The fact that the owner of a building having knowledge
of a contemplated burglary therein remains silent and presumably permitted entry
into the building for the purpose of arresting the intruder does not constitute a
consent to the act, and will not furnish a defense to the prosecution therefor, for
the reason that it in no wise affects the guilt of the accused .... Owner persuading
a person to enter building and take his property constitutes a consent to such
entry and taking, and for that reason is a complete defense-...for the act charged
as burglary.'" Adams v. State, 13 Ala. App. 33o, 69 So. 357, 359 (1915) (quoting
from 11 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1043 (1 ith ed.)). See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.
146, 155-58 (1922).
310ne writer suggests that contemporaneous criminal intent should always make
an entry into business premises unlawful since necessity requires the public to
enter and the business proprietor has no effective control over the particular people
who desire to enter. 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 323, 324 (1950).
'*People v. Sears, 62 Cal. 2d 737, 401 P.2d 938, 945, 44 Cal. Rptr. 33o (965)
(concurring opinion).
=State v. Howard, 64 S.C. 344, 42 S.E. 173, 175 (1902).
HNote, 51 CoLum. L. REV. 1009, 1025-27 (1951). "When a person committing a
crime in a building is not a trespasser but is present as a guest or by right, there
1967]
